Objectivity in the sciences is a much-touted yet problematic concept. It is sometimes held up as characterising scientific knowledge, yet operational definitions are diverse and call for such paradoxical genius as the ability to see without a perspective, to predict repeatability, to elicit nature’s own self-revelation, or to discern the structure of reality with inerrancy. Here we propose a positive and general definition of objectivity based on work in the Reformational philosophy tradition. We recognise a suite of relation-frames–ways in which (...) things function and relate to each other, which can be analytically distinguished in the process of conceptual abstraction. These relation-frames also ground the diverse aspects of scientific analysis within which relationships and properties may be abstracted from entities and systems. We argue that objectivity can be understood as characteristic of representations that attempt to portray a subject in an earlier relation-frame than that in which it characteristically functions. In short, objectivity is projection. This proposal is exemplified from mathematics and the natural sciences and some possible objections to it are considered, as well as its extension to the social sciences. (shrink)

Our paper contributes to the rapidly expanding body of experimental research on transformative decision making, and in the process, marks out a novel empirical interpretation for assessments of subjective value in transformative contexts. We start with a discussion of the role of subjective value in transformative decisions, and then critique extant experimental work that explores this role, with special attention to Reuter and Messerli (2018). We argue that current empirical treatments miss a crucial feature of practical deliberation manifesting across a (...) variety of everyday decisions: often, people attach more weight to decision criteria that they can know—a phenomenon known as the “evaluability bias.” In transformative contexts, if people cannot know the subjective value of an option, they are unlikely to attach it much weight. Despite this, people may care very much about such value. We then use this point to develop and present new empirical results that, in addition to supporting our concerns about evaluability bias, support the hypothesis that people care about subjective value. Our work enriches the current philosophical understanding of transformative decisions and helps to frame the emerging experimental paradigm for the empirical dimensions of the debate. (shrink)

Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism _implicitly_. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results (...) of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate. (shrink)

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the United States Supreme Court announced a paradigm shift in jurisprudence. Drawing specifically on mounting scientific evidence that adolescents are qualitatively different from adults in their decision-making capacities, the Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are not adults in all but age. The Court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons. The Supreme Court further solidified (...) its position regarding adolescents as less than fully mature and responsible decisionmakers in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012). In each case, the Court concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that children under 18 years of age possess adult capacities for personal agency, rationality, and mature choice. This study explores the implications of the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama for the “mature minor” standard for medical decision making. It argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller require no less than a radical reassessment of how healthcare institutions, courts of law, and public policy are obliged to regard minors as medical decisionmakers. The “mature minor” standard for medical decision making must be abandoned. (shrink)

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)

IntroductionBisphenol A is highly debated and studied in relation to a variety of health outcomes. This large variation in the literature makes BPA a topic that is prone to selective use of literature, in order to underpin one’s own findings and opinion. Over time, selective use of literature, by means of citations, can lead to a skewed knowledge development and a biased scientific consensus. In this study, we assess which factors drive citation and whether this results in the overrepresentation of (...) harmful health effects of BPA.MethodsA citation network analysis was performed to test various determinants of citation. A systematic search identified all relevant publications on the human health effect of BPA. Data were extracted on potential determinants of selective citation, such as study outcome, study design, sample size, journal impact factor, authority of the author, self-citation, and funding source. We applied random effect logistic regression to assess whether these determinants influence the likelihood of citation.ResultsOne hundred sixty-nine publications on BPA were identified, with 12,432 potential citation pathways of which 808 citations occurred. The network consisted of 63 cross-sectional studies, 34 cohort studies, 29 case-control studies, 35 narrative reviews, and 8 systematic reviews. Positive studies have a 1.5 times greater chance of being cited compared to negative studies. Additionally, the authority of the author and self-citation are consistently found to be positively associated with the likelihood of being cited. Overall, the network seems to be highly influenced by two highly cited publications, whereas 60 out of 169 publications received no citations.ConclusionIn the literature on BPA, citation is mostly driven by positive study outcome and author-related factors, such as high authority within the network. Interpreting the impact of these factors and the big influence of a few highly cited publications, it can be questioned to which extent the knowledge development in human literature on BPA is actually evidence-based. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

To comprehend pain, disease, death and suffering as being meaningful - beyond the firing of synapses, the collapse of human abilities, and the mere end of life - requires a context in which to evaluate essential connotations, as well as to place and integrate understandings. If pain and suffering are to have enduring significance, they must be situated within a nest of ontological background assumptions, standards of inquiry, and epistemological foundations. Where secular bioethics fails to give deep meaning to suffering, (...) Christian bioethics succeeds. This essay analyzes the divergent meanings of suffering endorsed by the various Christian religions as conceptualized through the different metaphysical, epistemological, and sociological assumptions of each religion. (shrink)

A truly Christian bioethics challenges the nature, substance, and application of secular morality, dividing Christians from non-Christians, accenting central moral differences, and providing content-full forthrightly Christian guidance for action. Consequently, Christian bioethics must be framed within the metaphysical and theological commitments of Traditional Christianity so as to provide proper orientation toward God. In contrast, secular bioethicists routinely present themselves as providing a universal bioethics acceptable to all reasonable and rational persons. Yet, such secular bioethicists habitually insert their own biases and (...) prejudices into their moral conclusions, ethical consultations, and political aspirations, without any real justification. As this article explores, the ideologically driven anti-Christian commitments, including commitments to human rights and social justice, embodied within contemporary bioethics routinely illustrate the increasing gap between the traditionally Christian and the devoutly secular, further deepening the culture wars. (shrink)

This article raises three challenges to Richard McCormick's proportionalism. First, adequately to judge proportionate reason requires the specification of a particular background moral content and metaphysical context. Absent such specification, evaluation of proportionate reason is inherently and deeply ambiguous. Second, to resolve such ambiguity and yet remain Christian, proportionalism must adopt a forthrightly Christian moral content set within a straightforwardly Christian metaphysics. This move will, however, set Christian bioethics off as sectarian—a conclusion McCormick wishes to avoid. Third, even if proportionalism (...) were to adopt a Christian moral content and metaphysics to avoid such ambiguity, its methodology sets aside a key aspect of the Christian life: repentance. Proportionalism does not account for the core reality that repentance plays in one's personal encounter with and knowledge of God. As I will argue, the challenge in part is that moral action cannot be adequately conceptualized, nor can moral theology be properly understood, outside of the authentic practice of the religious life, and repentance is central to that Christian reality. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the central problem in a medical ethics issue is determining which course of action is morally correct. There are some aspects of ethical issues that will yield to such analysis. However, at the core of important medical moral problems is an irreducible dilemma in which all possible courses of action, including inaction, seem ethically unsatisfactory. When facing these issues ethical behaviour depends upon an individual's understanding and acceptance of this painful dilemma without recourse to external (...) moral authority. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Peter Dabrock's “Drawing distinctions responsibly and concretely: A European Protestant perspective on foundational theological bioethics.” I explore the ways in which Dabrock announces nontraditional Christian assumptions to guide Christian bioethics, engages the secular bioethical agenda on the very terms set by and congenial to the field of secular bioethics, and searches for insights from philosophy and science through which to recast Christian moral judgments. For example, he cites approvingly, as if they were expressive of Christian (...) moral concerns: human rights, democracy, and state-based social redistribution of resources to satisfy welfare entitlements. In this short essay, I argue that Dabrock has unduly limited the role of Traditional Christian theology to guide bioethics and, consequently, has also wrongly characterized the Christian moral life and Christian social/political obligations. (shrink)

Despite the well-documented social, economic, and adaptive advantages for young children, adolescents, and adults, the traditional family in the West is in decline. A growing percentage of men and women choose not to be bound by the traditional moral and social expectations of marriage and family life. Adults are much more likely than in the past to live as sexually active singles, with a concomitant increase in forms of social isolation as well as in the number of children born outside (...) of marriage. These social shifts are also connected to public policies that provide incentives for individuals to exit the family, leaving behind its social, capital, and economic resources. The individualistic character of the social-democratic egalitarian ideology that underlies the current dominant approaches to health care financing in Western Europe and much of North America, for example, is associated with a decline in family stability. Welfare entitlements, including state-based health care, have made it easier to exit the family, undermining the centrality of the family’s core human relationships. This essay argues for the importance of recognizing the cardinal role and reality of the family and for the importance of family-based health care savings accounts for preserving family integrity, while also providing for sustainable long-term health care reform. (shrink)

Die voortgesette proses van implementering van nuwe materiaal wat gebruik word vir katkisasie in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika vertoon 'n besondere trajek. Die proses het, in terme van geloof, begin met die formalisering van sowel die geloofsbegrip as die beskrywing van die inhoud van geloof. Dit is voortgesit deur 'n proses van die objektivering van die inhoud van geloof tot feite wat geleer kan word en is uiteindelik voltrek deur die implementering van 'n pragmatiese opvoedkundige doelwit waarin geloof (...) bloot 'n middel tot 'n doel geword het. Die trajek kan kortliks soos volg beskryf word: • Die Heidelbergse Kategismus Geloof is die aanneming van die beloftes van God wat vertroue in die lewende God skep. • 'Kortbegrip': Geloof is sekere kennis van God en sy beloftes en 'n hartlike vertroue dat al my sondes om Christus ontwil vergewe is. • Die belydenis van die Hervormers: Ek glo in God beteken dat ek al my vertroue op God stel en Hom op sy woord neem. • Geloofsleer: Geloof is kennis van die Woord van God en vertroue in die God van die Woord. • Geloof en Lewe 11: Geloof is die toe-eiening van kenbare geloofoorleweringe wat in die Bybel opgeneem is. Die kerk kan daarom kinders deur 'n proses van kategese begelei tot geloofsvolwassenheid. Vandag is die uitgangspunt van katkisasie en die motivering daarvoor in die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika die oortuiging dat die kerk kinders deur 'n proses van kategese tot godsdienstige volwassenheid kan lei. Van Selms se kategismus pas nie in die trajek wat hier beskryf word nie. Die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika sou vandag heeltemal anders gelyk het as meer as een generasie van die lidmate van die Kerk aan hierdie kategeseboek blootgestel was. (shrink)

The second of these lines seems to be the result of an interpolation designed to spell out the implicit sense of the first. In 241–6 Ion has expressed amazement that Creusa should be weeping at the sight of Apollo's sanctuary, a sight which brings other visitors joy. She prefaces her explanation of this with an assurance which in its transmitted form is elegantly translated by Grégoire: ‘Il n'est point discourtois de ta part, étranger, de marquer ta surprise au sujet de (...) mes pleurs.’ But there are reasons for doubting I the authenticity of line 248: Line 247 is self-sufficient, as is shown by IA 1402: τ μν σόν, νενι, γενναίως χει. This also gives the closest parallel for the use of τ σόν in reference to the attitude which a previous speaker's words have just expressed. Other instances of τ σόν, tout court, are helpfully grouped in Allen and Italie's Concordance to Euripides, s.v. σός. τ σόν…[adverbial phrase] χει occurs also in Hek. 1195 and Med. 312; cf. HF 165, Hel. 893, Pho. 995 with τομόν. These make it unlikely that τ χόν in our passage is to be taken adverbially, as perhaps Grégoire intended with ‘de ta part’, rather than as subject of χει. Tro. 82 might be adduced for the alternative , but there is no reason for Creusa to be saying emphatically ‘as far as you are concerned’. (shrink)

' I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. [] Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.' Australian Journal of Philosophy, 71:3 (1993).

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

Semantic Indexicality shows how a simple syntax can be combined with a propositional language at the level of logical analysis. It is the adoption of such a base language which has not been attempted before, and it is this which constitutes the originality of the book. Cresswell's simple and direct style makes this book accessible to a wider audience than the somewhat specialized subject matter might initially suggest.